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Public Summary
Integrated Deterrence in the Baltics and Romania Strategic Evaluation

Office of Defense
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The Department of Defense (DoD) sponsors strategic evaluations of security cooperation (SC) programs and activities pursuant to, Section 383, title 10, U.S. Code and DoD Instruction 5132.14, "Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise." The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships (DASD(GP)) and the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) commissioned an evaluation of the effects of SC on the strategy of integrated deterrence. DoD commissioned RAND, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center, to conduct a study titled "Security Cooperation and Integrated Deterrence: Case Studies." The project assessed the extent SC contributes to U.S. integrated deterrence objectives. A major purpose of the study was to assess what forms of SC best align with the demands of integrated deterrence. This summary provides an unclassified synopsis of findings from RAND's classified report.

Approach and Methodology. RAND approached the project in five steps:

1. Framed the concept of integrated deterrence and derived a set of criteria to assess U.S. defense activity effects on the strategy's objectives.
2. Assessed the effects of SC activities that have contributed to deterrence in the past.
3. Identified two case studies for further detailed research.
4. Derived key principles to assess the deterrent effect of SC activities for each case study.
5. Analyzed and reported the findings and conclusions concerning the effects of SC activities' contribution to achieve strategic objectives and made recommendations to further optimize future activities.

To define integrated deterrence, project staff reviewed official U.S. Government strategy and concept statements, public speeches by DoD senior officials, and published interviews by those officials. Project staff supplemented those sources with interviews of DoD leaders involved in developing the strategy and concept statements studied. Project staff members reviewed the broader literature on deterrence to inform their framework for assessing SC activities, which informed their understanding of how it would contribute to deterrence in particular cases.

The case studies were informed by a detailed review of both unclassified and classified literature, to include U.S. and NATO strategy documents, interviews with officials in the U.S. and at the U.S. Combatant Commands, and field work within the countries themselves, including discussions with U.S. Embassy personnel, host nation officials, and independent analysts.

Key Findings. In addressing the key question of the project - the role of security cooperation in advancing integrated deterrence goals - RAND identified several findings. They include:

- **Many U.S. objectives with any ally or partner engaged in a SC relationship will extend beyond deterrence**, to encompass other goals such as cultivating a strong, long-term relationships.
- **Even when deterrence is a priority, SC alone cannot shift balances or perceptions sufficiently but should be a part of a larger defense strategy.** Still, SC can play a supporting role in augmenting other decisive actions by the United States and its allies or partners to achieve desired deterrent effects.
- **Areas for improvement focused on addressing traditional barriers to effectiveness**, including information sharing, technology cooperation, and increasing the numbers of U.S. SC specialist personnel.
- **The United States should not measure SC outcomes primarily by their deterrent effect.** Other potential values of SC, such as building long-term relationships, preventing rivals from gaining new influence, and supporting defense institution building may be more important priorities.
- **The U.S. should focus its SC efforts with threatened allies and partners on institutional, logistical, and interoperability goals at least as much as direct military capacity building.** Drawing allies and partners more completely into U.S. operational plans, networks, and processes, and improving allied and partner planning and operational effectiveness in institutional terms, may make a bigger difference in warfighting outcomes than specific additional systems, and may have greater deterrent effects.
- **The SC enterprise should take advantage of greater Reserve component involvement.** For example, the National Guard State Partnership Program consistently emerges as one of the most successful SC programs in many countries. It enjoys particular advantages by creating long-term, mutually beneficial relationships, allowing deep cooperation and consistent access, basing, and overflight permissions from host governments.